Subject matter of this disclosure pertains to the financial services industry, but it is not so limited. Financial services consist mainly of information flow from the customer to the broker (investment information); from customer to broker (placing orders); broker to market center (order entry); market center to broker (order execution); and finally, back to the customer (execution confirmation). Hence, they lend themselves to communications via electronic media such as the Internet and other data and computer networks.
One aspect of the financial services industry is new issuances to offer and issue shares of stock and/or debt in a company or entity to the public. This process of identifying potential buyers and gauging their demand is referred to in the investment banking field as book building. In non-securities based applications this process is called building an order boo. The current process of book building by investment bankers typically includes several stages. In the first step, the underwriter or investment banking firm determines which investors will be invited to participate. Typically this involves certain favored investors. Next, the underwriter obtains indications of interest from those invited to participate. These might be in the form of bids of various types. At this point, the underwriter has an appreciation of the demand curve for the new issue, including and when bids were submitted and/or revised. At this point, the underwriter arrives at an issuance price, although it is not understood how this is done by those outside the investment banking community. As a result, there is frequently oversubscription, where more shares or debt instruments are requested than are available. There have been a number of techniques used to deal with oversubscription; for instance, distribution of shares on a pro-rata basis.
In general, this process is believed to be relatively inefficient and unattractive, at least from the standpoint of the issuers. As currently carried out, book building is neither democratic nor equitable nor open to the public. A number of abuses have been identified in the current system. One is spinning of shares in the so-called “hot” (highly in demand) initial public offerings to favored investment banking clients. Amongst abuses in addition to the spinning problem are underpricing by investment bankers of initial public offerings. It is believed that underpricing has certain advantages for investment bankers but deprives the issuer of funds creating a “conflict-of-interest” between the investment banker and their customer, the issuer. It is believed that underpricing occurs both with equity (stock) and with debt issuances. Other abuses include “tie-ins,” unlawful quid pro quo side agreements, yield burning, artificial inflation of after-market prices in the secondary market (“laddering”), and biased recommendations by research analysts working for investment banks.
Underpricing is believed especially to damage the issuers and the markets. Also connected with underpricing abuses is post-issuance flipping, i.e., immediate sales by the favored recipients of initial public offerings. In addition, current approaches do not provide for quantity discounts for large purchasers, or purchasers who help set the price with early indications-of-interest. Furthermore, as a result of its monopoly power in pricing new issuances, the underwriting industry faces antitrust issues.
In addition, there are globalization issues in connection with securities offerings due to the presence of competitive international markets and differing regulations between countries.
People have recognized these problems and some solutions have been implemented; however, all are unsatisfactory. One method is direct public offerings of securities via the Internet. There have been over 200 direct public offerings carried out via the Internet in the United States. They typically involve relatively little participation by underwriters with instead the issuer offering the equities direct to the public. Of course, this system does not provide any actual specific pricing mechanism.
Other approaches to new issuances include Internet options such as the well-known Dutch auction of initial public offerings. In this case, most of the pricing and allocation decisions are removed from the discretion of the issuer and/or underwriter. Investors express their interest level and price threshold, and the offering price is set at the highest level at which all the shares to be offered might be sold (i.e., the “clearing price”). Any bidder might bid for as many shares as he wants. The actual offering price is fixed at the maximum price at which all shares are cleared (sold) with regard to the portfolio of bids. Allocation sometimes includes reduction of the number of shares offered to each bidder, perhaps on a pro rata basis.
There are drawbacks to Dutch auctions. First, there is lack of transparency and feedback in that the bidders are bidding “blind” and are typically uncertain as to what other bids are being offered. Consequently, there is little or no information provided back to the bidders, except perhaps informally. Because of the lack of feedback, Dutch auctions also typically exhibit underpricing problems. The company's investment bankers often still set the final offering price at their discretion, since they can manipulate the number of shares on offer and hence the price. Uncertainties regarding bids, and the lack of consistent methods of valuation and related pricing information, constitute an inadequate approach to determining appropriate initial prices, thereby minimizing attractiveness of the Dutch auction, at least in the United States equity market.
Another approach which has been used is an new issuance entirely via electronic mail, involving the issuer taking conditional offers to buy shares without deeming it to be a pre-effective sale under the U.S. SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) rules. In this'case, the issuer circulates an e-mail notice after posting a prospectus on the Internet. Bidders are allowed to bid on the shares after opening an account to do so.
Then, before the actual effectiveness of the registration statement in connection with the stock issuance, an e-mail notice is sent requesting reaffirmation of the offers to buy without an actual commitment to buy. Subsequently, after the registration statement of the issuance is effective, an e-mail notice is sent to each bidder stating that the offering is about to price, and that the offers will be binding unless withdrawn immediately. Again, this approach includes no particular provision of providing bidding information back to the bidders.
Similar options have been used in the debt market; for instance, for municipal bonds issued by public entities. These consist primarily of numerical auctions. Typically, the bidder cannot see all bids and only the latest best price (i.e., lowest yield) is visible. However, except for the auctions of U.S. Treasury securities, auction systems for other types of debt instrument have been relatively rare.